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THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO DISASTER:
THE EAST BAY HILLS FIRE

This study examines the immediate community response to the East Bay Hills Fires. It
investigates how mental health and other human services were mobilized and delivered in the
disaster-affected communities in Alameda County during the initial post-impact period within
one month of the frrestorm, with respect to: (1) the extent of service delivery; (2) the
providers and recipients of these services; (3) obstacles to service delivery; (4) the level of
coordination; and (5) the timeliness of response.
THE EVENT
On October 20, 1991, a frrestorm destroyed more than 3,000 homes and took 25 lives in the
hillside residential neighborhoods of Oakland and Berkeley, California. A brush frre that had
burned, and was extinguished the day before, and reignited. Gusts of hot, dry air swirled
through the hillside groves of Monterey pines and eucalyptus trees that were damaged by five
years of drought and a freeze the previous winter. Many of the homes, built before frre codes
existed, used highly-flammable wood shake siding and roofing in their designs. On many
properties brush and overhanging branches were allowed to accumulate.
The fire, spread by winds gusting up to 65 miles per hour destroyed 2,777 single-family
homes and 433 apartments in the 1,600 acre fire zone. The East Bay Hills Fire was declared
officially under control on October 23, 1991 at 8:00 a.m., some seventy hours after it began.
To subdue the frrestorm, an estimated 25 million gallons of water were used by 1,844 frrefighters. The cost of property damage has been put at $2 billion. The Red Cross reported
over 4,500 people were homeless and 444 ill or injured as a result of the worst residential frre
in American history.
METHODS
Instrument Design and Expert Panel Review
We developed an instrument to assess the immediate post-disaster needs using criteria
developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Institute
of Mental Health (NIMH) in order to determine:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Who is delivering and receiving direct services, outreach, consultation and education?
What types of services are being offered?
How are specific cultural, ethnic and geographical needs being met?
What is the professional perception of immediate service needs?

The instrument was critically reviewed by three disaster mental health experts from NIMH,
the State of California, Department of Mental Health, and the Suicide Prevention
Center/Family Service of Los Angeles. We assembled a panel of experts, composed of 25
county disaster coordinators in California, who received a copy of the original instrument and
a brief Disaster Expert Panel Review assessment form which asked the following questions:
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1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Are the questions stated clearly?
Would this questionnaire be useful as a planning tool?
Would this questionnaire be useful as a needs assessment tool?
Would this questionnaire assist you in identifying the potential demand for mental
health services after a disaster?
What additional information would you want to have included in this questionnaire?

Key Informant Interviews
We developed a sample of key agencies that provided services to the disaster victims through
a review of local newspaper notices, and phone contacts with staff of the American Red
Cross, the NIMH, the State of California Department of Mental Health, and the East Bay
Community Foundation. Letters were then written to key administrators, soliciting their
cooperation in the study.
The sample of twelve key informants was selected to represent public mental health agencies,
United Way agencies, the Red Cross and other community-based organizations that responded
to fIre victims. The interviews were conducted by a team of interviewers six weeks after the
disaster. The key informants helped to identify other administrators and clinicians who took
part in the immediate emergency response for inclusion in our survey sample.
The Survey
The sample consisted of 40 respondents within the following classifIcations: 1) sixteen
administrative and clinical staff from seven agencies representing public mental health and
hospital-based mental health; 2) fourteen clinicians from the private sector who volunteered
services to public mental health agencies and to the American Red Cross; and 3) ten
administrative staff from human services organizations in the non-profIt sector who provided
a wide range of services to disaster victims.

RESULTS
Expert Panel Review
The questionnaire was critically well-received, with 20 of the 25 expert respondents indicating
positive views of its usefulness. The respondents, in general, regarded the questionnaire they
reviewed as useful for planning and conducting a needs assessment and for identifying the
potential demand for disaster mental health services. Those who were critical (fIve
respondents) made positive suggestions for improvements of the questionnaire, most citing
that it was too specifIc to the disaster. Some expert respondents questioned whether the exact
numbers of individuals served, their marital status and their ethnicity, would be available to
agency respondents one month after the disaster. Some suggestions were directed toward
longer term objectives than were the focus of our investigation, e.g.: 1) the coordination of
clinicians in private practice who may be willing to volunteer services; 2) any contingency
plans that mental health agencies may have to re-allocate and re-assign staff to disaster duties;
and 3) the need for mental health resources in the recovery phase, 3 - 12 months after a
disaster.
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Key Infonnant Interviews
Disaster Coordinator, Alameda County Department of Mental Health (ACDMH): The
Alameda County Department of Mental Health was the initial mental health agency to
coordinate with the State Department of Mental Health in this disaster. The agency
responded immediately, mobilizing staff and resources for disaster interventions as a result of
recent experience in managing the Loma Prieta Earthquake response. The agency worked
collaboratively with other community agencies, including the American Red Cross and the
mental health systems in Santa Clara, Contra Costa, San Mateo and Santa Barbara Counties.
As the key mental health agency, the ACDMH was responsible for staffmg the Disaster
Assistance Center (DAC) when it opened. Its own staff and volunteers provided a variety of
services, including outreach at the coroner's office, "ride-alongs" with safety personnel,
escorting disaster victims to the fire zone, and debriefings of emergency service workers.
Agency personnel staffed a hotline and mailed infonnation to 4,000 victims on the FEMA
mailing list. The volunteers whom they mobilized for this disaster had previously received
training by the agency staff as part of the NIMH-funded training program implemented
following the Loma Prieta Earthquake. The agency was able to mobilize outreach efforts,
including staff support and consultation, to the schools in the peripheral area because of a
previous contract with the Oakland Schools to provide training after the major earthquake.
Disaster Coordinator, City of Berkeley, Mental Health Services (BMHS): This city mental
health department had recently (since July 1, 1991) gained jurisdictional status, and elected to
launch disaster response efforts independent of Alameda County activities. A parallel effort,
therefore, was being made to provide disaster mental health services, including outreach and
drop-in services to fire victims, and consultation, training and critical incident stress
debriefings to emergency service workers within its jurisdiction. BMHS also implemented a
crisis intervention program, including a 24-hour crisis telephone service and a mobile crisis
team. This provided on-site crisis intervention and supportive counseling at the evacuation
center, at Alta Bates Hospital emergency room and at the base of the devastated area in the
Berkeley Hills. Debriefing sessions were offered to staff and volunteers but were reported as
being poorly attended.
BMHS is crisis-oriented and receptive to volunteers and participation from other sectors of
the community. Previous collaborative efforts with the University of California Student
Health Service to mobilize resources in response to community-scale crises have afforded
opportunities for the networking and coordination necessary for managing a large-scale
disaster response. What is unique about Berkeley Mental Health's response is the utilization
of large numbers of professionally-trained volunteers, called the Mental Health Volunteer
Project Disaster Response Team. Activation of the volunteer cadre enabled this relatively
small agency to offer a large array of services, including a considerable outreach effort.
Chief, Department of Psychiatry, Children's Hospital-Oakland: The Department of
Psychiatry's outreach efforts following the fire were directed towards school systems, and
were targeted solely to the children affected in the fire zone. Services included school
consultations, classroom intervention and parent groups. The hospital Psychiatry Department
has an ongoing interest in children affected by community-wide traumatic events. It has
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developed interventions for victims of trauma, including community violence and the effects
of the Loma Prieta Earthquake, offered training programs for school personnel, and is
engaged in ongoing research in this area. All of these activities were supported by a private
endowment provided by Children's Hospital, and were essentially separate from other mental
health activities in the community.
The staff's most successful efforts, however, were with the counselors from one particular
school. The Department offered group sessions to parents and school personnel at a private
school in the disaster area. Children's Hospital staff worked closely with the parent
association in this close-knit school. Follow-up activities involved consultation with school
counselors over the next several weeks. The counselors reported that many of the children
indicated emotional disturbances. The parent groups, however, were not well attended after
the first session and were subsequently canceled.
The hospital staff continued their consultation activities over the next several weeks, with
teachers and counselors in three schools in the impacted area. Staff observed that parents
were not identifying traumatized children. Therefore, in collaboration with the school
counselors, hospital staff employed case-finding techniques such as children's drawings to
identify those at risk.
Director of Disaster Services, Chief of Disaster Health Service, and Coordinator of Mental
Health Services/Crisis Intervention Team, The American Red Cross: The Red Cross, a
volunteer-driven organization, played an outstanding role in this disaster through its Oakland
and Golden Gate chapters. The Red Cross assembled a volunteer cadre, provided by the
naval and coast guard personnel from locally stationed ships and commands. This cadre
staffed the Disaster Welfare Inquiry Unit (OWl) phone bank. It processed over 3,000
inquiries after the fire.
The delivery of mental health services is not ordinarily a part of the mission of the Red Cross
in a disaster. The Red Cross mass care workers will often observe considerable grief and
bereavement among the disaster victims in the shelters. The Red Cross makes referrals to
local departments of mental health. Major changes in mental health policy at the Red Cross
have taken place over the past two years, through the establishment of a National Disaster
Mental Health Task Force, as part of its concern for emotional support not only to victims
but, also to Red Cross volunteers and other emergency service workers. The American
Psychological Association, through an agreement with the Red Cross, has been providing
emergency mental health training to Red Cross volunteers who are also licensed mental health
professionals.
This was the first disaster where the mental health component of the Red Cross was utilized.
A large number of professional therapists volunteered their services to the Red Cross,
however, only experienced clinicians and Red Cross-trained therapists were utilized.
Conflicts emerged between the Red Cross and the public mental health agency in the early
days of the disaster regarding the use of mental health volunteers. In the first days following
the fire, ACDMH workers lacked proper identification to enable them access to the service
centers. The Red Cross assisted them by issuing name badges used by Red Cross crisis
teams. Turf issues emerged, however, between mental health staff from the ACDMH and
4

Red Cross volunteer counselors who were assigned to the scene by the Red Cross mental
health coordinator. The Red Cross crisis teams encountered immediate rejection from
ACDMH staff inasmuch as the director of that agency's disaster response regarded her agency
as having the sole jurisdiction in assisting the fire victims at the DAC. After some days,
these turf issues were resolved, but essentially the Red Cross-trained counselors were limited
to serving only Red Cross volunteers. Red Cross debriefing teams scheduled sessions for
volunteer workers, which however, were poorly attended. We were informed that this may
have been due to the fact that many of the volunteers were exhausted from excessively long
(l2-hour) shifts and often returned to their homes, a considerable distance away, after their
shifts ended. Overall, the efforts of the crisis intervention teams were well-received,
appropriately utilized, and much appreciated by Red Cross personnel in the field. There were
difficulties, however, in the organization of the mental health response. A shortage of
telephones and cellular phones made it difficult to obtain information in the field and to
provide an organized response.

Senior Vice President, Alameda County United Way: Several United Way agencies provided
counseling services to disaster victims, specifically Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social
Services, Jewish Family Services, and Family Service of the East Bay. Services provided
included individual counseling, support groups for survivors, community debriefings,
telephone crisis counseling and information and referral services. Among other services
offered by United Way agencies were legal, financial and housing assistance, clothing and
food. An outstanding service that United Way provided was the preparation and distribution
of the newsletter, From the Ground Up, that included comprehensive information regarding
community resources. This newsletter was sent to the entire list of DAC registrants.
The United Way served, as well, as a focal point for coordinating the efforts of 50 new and
pre-existing neighborhood groups, collectively entitled Phoenix Associations. The primary
task of its organ, The Phoenix Journal, was "to help rebuild the East Bay and to maintain
communication between the people who lost their homes on October 20, 1991, and among
those whose homes survived."
The United Way participated, as well, in planning emergency preparedness activities,
including spearheading the East Bay Fire Emergency Fund collaboratively with the Red
Cross. A Mental Health Task Force had been formed at the time of the fire within the United
Way planning structure, specifically the Oakland Community Fund. Task force members
identified mental health needs of fire victims and discussed strategies for allocating needs for
services to school children in the impacted area.
Associate Director, University Health Service, University of California, Berkeley: The
University's mental health response was directed to the university community.
Approximately 500 students, faculty and staff lost their homes and were displaced by the fire.
Crisis services were immediately made available under the University's emergency plan.
University Health Service (UHS) staff integrated with Berkeley Mental Health (BMHS)
personnel as part of their community crisis efforts. This mechanism was developed over the
past years in response to the Lorna Prieta Earthquake, a campus residential fire and a hostage
event. As a result, both agencies were able to mobilize collaborative efforts for fire victims.
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Although the campus was closed on the day following the fIre, the UHS was fully staffed and
functioned as a crisis center. Staff initiated crisis services, offered phone counseling and
organized the University's response. The UHS has established linkages with local counseling
resources as a result of the prior crises on the Berkeley campus. Their efforts on behalf of
the fIre victims in the university community were provided through NIMH funding as a
subcontractor with BMHS.
The Survey
The following information was derived from the survey:
Prior Clinical Experience
The respondents, on the whole, had prior clinical experiences with all age groups, and with
emergency service workers. The human service organization respondents worked with a
broad range of groups in the community, including representatives of business and industry,
and they participated in emergency preparedness activities.
Services Delivered
The public mental health agencies, with funds provided by FEMA/NIMH to the State of
California, delivered a wide range of disaster mental health services to fIre victims, including
crises counseling, outreach to disaster victims, individual and group counseling, critical
incident stress debriefIng, assistance to fIre and law enforcement personnel, school-based and
hospital-based interventions, community organization, training and education. The volunteers
provided clinical support in all of the activities of the mental health agencies where they
donated their time. The organizations in the voluntary sector also provided a wide range of
services to fIre victims, including crisis and bereavement counseling, information and referral,
assistance to families with young children and to older adults, housing assistance, and the
coordination of volunteer efforts.
The public mental health providers were reimbursed by federal funds. Hospital-based
services, however, did not receive special federal reimbursement. The non-profit agencies had
a variety of sources of reimbursement, which however, were not governmental ones. They
received reimbursement from the Red Cross, the Oakland Community Fund and the United
Way.
Service Providers
In the public mental health sector, services were provided by both paid professional staff and
volunteer psychologists, social workers, trained counselors, and psychiatrists. In the nonprofit sector, service providers included nurses, health educators, social workers and
administrative personnel. Professionals in both sectors were predominately Anglo, but also
included Latino, Asian/Pacific Islanders and African-American staff. Some of the agencies in
our sample hired additional staff to meet their disaster service needs: 1) the public mental
health agencies added staff and contracted with consultants; 2) the Red Cross hired a disaster
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mental health specialist; and 3) the University of California, Berkeley contracted with
consultants.

Service Recipients
The recipients of these services were predominantly Anglo adults. The children served
represented a more diverse population as a result of outreach activities to the schools. The
University of California, Berkeley population served was demographically representative of
the campus population.

Use of Media
The media were instrumental in disseminating information about available services. All the
mental health agencies prepared press releases and public service announcements for the print
and electronic media. The United Way had the primary responsibility of preparing an
information and referral newsletter that was mailed to all FEMA registrants. ACDMH
disseminated information at the Disaster Assistance Center and prepared posters that were
distributed community-wide.

Mobilization of Services
All agencies began delivery of their services immediately or during the first week after the
fire. All the mental health agencies activated their disaster plans and mobilized their staffs.
Both the public mental health and the voluntary sector organizations had developed
mechanisms for alerting and recruiting staff in an emergency. Much of this seems to have
been put in place since the Lorna Prieta Earthquake. These agencies used telephone trees and
other rapid mobilization techniques to alert their staff and volunteers.
All of the public and non-profit agency respondents perceived their efforts as effective or very
effective in the immediate aftermath of the fires. The volunteers self-ratings of effectiveness
varied, and appeared to be dependent upon whether their assignment enabled them to use their
clinical skills. Two of the agencies planned detailed evaluation of their services. BMHS
intended to carry out pre- and post-testing of victims, evaluation of the volunteer response,
follow-up of outreach efforts, and overall evaluation of services. The University of
California, Berkeley planned a needs assessment and a detailed record study of the 500 fire
victims who were either students or university personnel.

Demand for Services
The demand for services varied. There were fewer demands than expected at the DAC and
various outreach locations. There was less demand than expected at the support group
meetings held in the community. Clinical services for children were lower than expected at
clinic locations, with more requests for services at the schools. The university hospital-based
program reported more demand than expected. The volunteers in the mental health system
reported disappointment with the demand for their services. The Red Cross respondents
reported a greater than expected demand for crisis counseling but lower participation than
they had expected for debriefings offered to Red Cross personnel. Non-profit agencies
7

reported a range of responses in their expected demand for services, with the majority stating
either a greater or as expected demand for services.
Preparedness

All respondents reported being well-prepared for this disaster because of their participation in
previous community-scale crises. All agencies reported having a disaster plan, and except for
the hospital-based programs, participating in county-wide planning activities. The public
mental health agencies had received formal training in disaster interventions, including critical
incident stress debriefmg training. They had participated, as well, in prior NIMH-funded
training programs. The University hospital-based program reported having received no formal
training in disaster interventions. The volunteers reported having received "some" or
"extensive" training. The non-profit sector respondents had not received specific disaster
training; however, all had received crisis intervention training as it was relevant to their work.
Respondents from nine public and United Way agencies reported offering critical incident
stress debriefings, support groups and stress management workshops to help mitigate the
stress of their workers. One-half of the volunteers in the sample reported having received
such interventions.
Coordination

All respondents reported familiarity with the range of crisis services available in the
community; however, coordination among providers varied. The public mental health systems
reported good coordination with other providers during the fire. This included deployment
across jurisdictional lines, as there had been long-standing coordination with city emergency
services. The hospital-based programs reported limited coordination. The non-profit agencies
reported limited coordination with public mental health agencies, although they reported
extensive coordination among themselves.
The respondents reported the following cooperative arrangements: University of California,
Berkeley worked with BMHS and Red Cross staffs; campus-wide crisis teams worked with
fire and police. ACDMH shared resources with Solano, Santa Barbara, San Mateo and Santa
Clara county mental health departments, and the Red Cross. Children's Hospital-Oakland
offered evaluation and consultation to local school districts. Family Service of the East Bay
cooperated with the Red Cross and United Way community-based organizations. The
Chamber of Commerce provided staff support and materials, assisted the City of Oakland at
the DAC, and participated in the Fire Coalition. Berkeley-Oakland Support Services worked
closely with other relief agencies such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. Alta Bates
Hospital-Older Adults Services Center networked with other services for the elderly. The
United Way Information and Referral served as an information clearinghouse and published
daily updates. Eden Information and Referral cooperated with other agencies, including the
Red Cross, in providing housing lists and housing referrals. The Volunteer Center, Inc. was
the clearinghouse for volunteers to many other organizations and agencies, and served as the
liaison to the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, City of Oakland, and Office of Emergency
Services. Bananas, a child care resource agency, shared resources with other childcare
providers.
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Obstacles to Service Delivery
Public Mental Health Agencies
The major obstacles reported by public mental health systems were the lack of coordination
and cooperation with other mental health jurisdictions and with other emergency services
providers. There were also problems in dissemination of information about services and lack
of immediate publicity about services offered. There was a time-lag in implementing services
for school children, difficulties in determining where to locate mental health services, and
staffing problems. BMHS was burdened with calls from private practitioners volunteering
their services. There were problems integrating these volunteer services with those provided
by the staff.
Hospital-Based Mental Health
Children's Hospital-Oakland reported a lack of coordination of service delivery, stating that
the needs of children were neglected because of the trauma being experienced by the adults.
The respondent also reported organizational problems in service delivery due to a lack of
recognition of children's needs and where services for them should be located. He observed,
as well, resistance by officials to early intervention efforts on behalf of children.
Volunteer Clinicians
The major obstacles reported by the volunteer clinicians were: the lack of organization of the
public mental health agencies, their staffing problems and confusion about the location of
services. The overabundance of volunteers created confusion in making assignments and
problems in the allocation of volunteers to sites in the community. Volunteers also cited
general communication problems between the public mental health agencies, and poor
information dissemination to the public. Respondents from neighboring Solano and Marin
counties reported ACDMH's resistance to placing professional volunteers in the field after the
disaster. American Red Cross volunteers reported poor organization within the Red Cross as
well, stating that they were not informed about the availability and role of stress counselors.
Voluntary Sector Agencies
Major obstacles were also reported by respondents from the United Way agencies. Family
Services of the East Bay reported that the ACDMH was unresponsive to their offers of
assistance and that Red Cross administrators appeared disorganized. The Alameda County
United Way reported that there seemed to be considerable confusion and lack of organization
among all parties concerned in the response. Bananas reported that the large number of
volunteers offering help overburdened their system.
Respondents reported a lack of sensitivity by the Red Cross and the City of Berkeley to the
needs of the homeless in the city, when priority was being given to the fire victims. The
issue of the competitive needs of these two populations surfaced specifically in relation to
providing emergency shelter to fire victims, and apparently neglecting such needs in the
homeless. The fire victims, however, represented a different socioeconomic class than the
9

homeless, and there was strong community reaction to assigning priority status to this
"privileged" group of disaster victims.
Recommendations From Survey Respondents
Public mental health agency respondents recommended that their planning efforts for future
disasters should take into account a number of problem areas: 1) better integration of mental
health efforts into the city disaster plan through ongoing coordination with city officials;
2) better assessment of mental health needs to determine where services are to be located and
personnel reassigned; 3) integration of support groups with existing community institutions
such as the PTA and Senior Citizens centers; 4) provision of more comprehensive information
to mental health workers regarding where services are available in the community; and
5) clarification so that mental health workers can gain access to shelters, the DAC and other
locations where access is limited to emergency services personnel.
Respondents in United Way agencies recommended the following planning areas:
1) increased disaster planning, training and availability of funds for survivors; 2) fuller access
to underserved and vulnerable populations through better coordination with the lead agency;
3) substantive cooperation and mobilization of interagency networking capacity by the lead
mental health agency; 4) better community-wide coordination and integration of crisis
services; 5) rapid assessment of technical needs, including phone, FAX and other forms of
communication at the time of the emergency and in the immediate aftermath; and 6) a phone
line at the United Way Information and Referral set aside exclusively for disaster victims and
their needs.
Respondents in both public and non-profit agencies reported the need for more of the
following services: 1) individual services, case management and household advocacy;
2) outreach, home visits and aftercare; 3) planning for children's needs and services to
schools; 4) practical assistance and advocacy for victims; 5) public information services; and
6) debriefing and support for crisis intervention workers.
DISCUSSION
The Immediate Response
The major firestorm spread through affluent hillside communities and resulted in almost total
residential loss. The population was composed of predominantly long-term residents who
owned homes in the East Bay Hills: There were also apartments burned and renters
displaced. Taking into account the scale of the fire, there were relatively few fatalities or
injuries requiring hospitalization.
Public mental health agencies, namely Alameda County Department of Mental Health
(ACDMH) and City of Berkeley Mental Health Services (BMHS), were involved immediately
in offering crisis services to disaster victims. They mobilized and dispatched staff to the
scene of the fires, providing assistance to emergency service workers and to fire victims.
Although the public mental health response was timely, there were problems with
coordination, allocation of resources and utilization of professional volunteers. These
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problems were often a result of the absence of pre-disaster planning and networking among
mental health providers, city and other emergency preparedness agencies.
Leaders within the public mental health systems were confounded by jurisdictional vagaries,
and this affected adequate service delivery in the early phases of disaster response. Funding
for mental health services following a disaster becomes available through FEMA and the
NIMH. These funds are allocated to the local county mental health agencies. The designated
county agency has the authority to contract for additional services from local providers.
ACDMH was the key agency in this disaster and was responsible for staffing the DAC, Red
Cross shelters and serving as primary liaison to the emergency services network.
The fire destroyed areas of Berkeley, and city mental health officials mobilized their disaster
response based upon their perceived jurisdictional responsibilities to their constituency.
ACDMH, however, initially received exclusive program consultation from the disaster
coordinator of the State of California Department of Mental Health. Confusion occurred
because BMH was only recently assigned jurisdictional independence as a free-standing
mental health department. Because BMH had been overlooked initially by the State officials,
conflicts surfaced between city and county systems. This created problems in service
delivery, and turf issues emerged in the early aftermath of the fire. The city agency
ultimately was included in the State of California/NIMH loop and prepared a request for
funding.
Both systems had the experience and the training necessary to mobilize their resources for the
fire victims. Alameda County had dealt with a major natural disaster, the Lorna Prieta
Earthquake, that occurred two years prior to the firestorm. The City of Berkeley had
considerable experience with smaller-scale crises events, including a hostage crisis and a
fraternity fire in the university area. The major problems, then, were in the areas of
communication between the two systems, funded by NIMH, as well as their coordination with
the other organizations providing counseling to fire victims.
There was an abundance of mental health and counseling services offered by the non-profit
sector. United Way agencies, because of their administrative structure, customarily operated
separately from publicly funded mental health agencies. However, a disaster implies a unique
set of circumstances. There were problems in the delivery and utilization of counseling
services. Although information regarding the availability of their services was welldisseminated, there were several factors that contributed to their underutilization. In the first
week or two, disaster victims were primarily concerned with their basic needs. Mental health
workers assisted in these early efforts, including escorting victims to the disaster zone and
providing a presence at the DAC. As has been reported in other disasters, "counseling"
services offered at the DAC were poorly utilized. The debriefing efforts offered by mental
health professionals to the Red Cross volunteers were also poorly utilized due to fatigue and
by the desire of the volunteers to return home after long shift times. Awareness of these
problems eventually led to the formation of a mental health committee within the United Way
planning structure, specifically within the Oakland Community Fund. The committee, formed
in the wake of the fires, set about to address issues of need and resource allocation of public
and private mental health services to residents of Alameda County.
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The Volunteer Response
As in other recent disasters, there had been an outpouring of volunteers to assist in the mental
health efforts of both the NIMH-funded public sector systems and the American Red Cross.
Many of these volunteers had been trained by the local professional associations, the Red
Cross and training provided by NIMH-funded programs in the Bay Area. Both public
agencies reported difficulties in making effective use of the overabundance of volunteers who
offered their services after the fire. This was a problem that United Way agencies had to
confront, as well. The major issues had to do with screening of volunteers and administering
the volunteer effort. Although there was a clear need for counseling services, agencies had
difficulties integrating the volunteers into their efforts.
An example demonstrating the lack of effective coordination of formal and voluntary
resources was the difficulties experienced by the American Red Cross in having their trained
professional volunteers accepted by ACDMH in earlier phases of the disaster. That agency
permitted the Red Cross mental health cadre to provide services only to Red Cross volunteer
emergency service workers and not to disaster victims. Other trained mental health
professionals also reported frustrations with the lack of receptivity by ACDMH of their offers
to help.
The United Way agencies reported being overwhelmed, as well, by the volunteer response.
These organizations lacked the administrative support which would have enabled them to
utilize better this outpouring of help. This was particularly true in the early days of the
disaster and its immediate aftermath. We saw in this disaster, then, the positive results of
prior training efforts and the willingness of the private sector to offer assistance and the
negative results of inadequate planning which would have enabled these volunteers to be
utilized more effectively.
Community Organization
Because of the location of the fires in an affluent area, contiguous to a major university, and
impacting residents who had lived there for many years, the outpouring of resources and
offers of assistance were greater than in most disasters. Community homeowner associations
rapidly mobilized on behalf of disaster victims. They developed a strong political voice to
assure that the needs of the community were met. Outstanding in these efforts was the
Phoenix Coordinating Council, an umbrella organization established in the wake of the
fire storm to coordinate a network of existing neighborhood organizations in the devastated
hillside communities. The Phoenix Coordinating Council established a newsletter, The
Phoenix Journal, to disseminate critical information to area residents and to serve as a voice
in influencing government agencies and insurers. The Phoenix organizations, for example,
attempted to influence building codes and architectural policies of local government
development and planning councils.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The results of this study clearly indicate that mental health and other human services were
delivered in a timely fashion in the aftermath of the East Bay Fire. There were, however,
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problem areas that included: 1) inadequate pre-disaster planning, 2) lack of coordination, 3)
communication difficulties between and within systems in the area of technical
communication, 4) information-sharing between systems regarding the timing and location of
the mental health service response, and 5) coordination of volunteer efforts.
On the basis of our analysis, we recommend that:
1)

Public mental health agencies and non-profit organizations providing counseling
should identify clearly in their pre-disaster planning activities their jurisdiction, role
and activities.

2)

Better coordination is necessary within and between systems during the immediate
period following a disaster to assure more effective allocation of resources and
delivery of services to the community.

3)

Inasmuch as all the agencies reported a lack of telephone linkages within and external
to these organizations, they should assess problem areas on the basis of all past
disaster experiences and obtain technical assistance in order to improve emergency
communications capabilities.

4)

Pre-disaster guidelines should be established to assure essential networking capabilities
within the mental health system and optimal information-sharing regarding the
allocation of resources and services during a disaster.

5)

A volunteer coordinator position should be built into an organization's disaster plan,
and a screening committee established that would include representatives from local
professional organizations.
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